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The membership of the American Law Institute ("the ALI")
approved the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts ("ALI
Principles") in May of 2009.' In this Article, I draw on my
experience as Reporter on this project to add my perspective on an
interesting general question: is specialization of contract law wise
and, if so, in what contexts? For the purpose of this Article, general
contract law comprises the rules and standards exemplified by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts that apply generally to exchange
transactions. Specialized contract law consists of specific bodies of
contract rules that govern particular subject matter transactions,
such as insurance, employment, real estate, and the sale of goods. I
certainly cannot definitively answer the question of whether, in the
abstract, society is better off with general or specialized law, but my
experience in drafting the software rules sheds some light. In fact, I
am keenly aware of this issue because of occasional resistance to the
project on the ground that specialization was unnecessary.
In a fine recent contribution on the subject of generalization
versus specialization in contract law, Professor Nathan Oman
discusses several costs and benefits of generalization. I will rely on
his list, along with some embellishment of my own, in setting forth
some tentative conclusions about generalization and specialization
in the context of software contracts. Obviously, the ALI Principles
are not law unless and until courts adopt them. But for purposes of
* Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author
is the Reporter for the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts ("ALI Principles"). Thanks to Nathan Oman for reviewing a
draft of this Article.
1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2009).
2. According to Professor Nathan Oman, general contract law is "a single
set of legal principles that purports to govern liability for basically all voluntary
transactions." Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEo.
L.J. 77, 77 (2009). "[Slpecialized bodies of law govern[] particular kinds of
transactions." Id. at 78. But the distinction is not sharp once courts apply
general contract law to decide specific cases involving particular subject areas.
3. See id. at 79.
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comparison between general and specialized law, I will proceed as if
the ALI Principles constitute a body of law.
I. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GENERAL CONTRACT LAW
Professor Oman usefully identifies many of the possible costs
and benefits of general contract law.4 I cannot do justice to Oman's
elaborate discussion in this Article, but, greatly simplified, he first
presents three major costs of generalization. First, generalization
does not work well because abstract, general principles provide poor
guidance for predicting outcomes.5 Oman notes that this argument
is essentially an attack on formalism and nicely summarizes: "The
push for a single set of rules to govern all voluntary transactions
seems to rest on the misguided hope that law can be made into a
simple set of abstract premises from which correct results can be
deduced."6
Second, Oman suggests that generalization fails because of the
absence of a single preeminent normative theory of contract that can
guide decision making. Instead, contract law consists of various
normative choices in disparate contexts.8 The development of
different rules for different subject matters logically follows from
contract law's normative pluralism.'
Third, Oman points out that general contract law often
produces "undesirable outcomes," in part because of the failure of
formal law and a unitary theory, and in part because of general
contract law's idealized vision of fair bargaining between equal
partners.10 In my view, however, the equal-bargaining paradigm
4. See id.
5. Id. at 82.
6. Id. Formalism has not been in vogue for a quite some time. See
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RIcHNEss OF CONTRACT LAW 126-28, 175-79 (1998).
7. Oman, supra note 2, at 82-83.
8. Id. at 79 ("[Ilt is exceedingly unlikely that a single normative theory
can actually cover all of the factual circumstances that give rise to 'contracts.'");
see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAw: NEW ESSAYS 206, 240-41 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("In contract
law, as in life, all meritorious values must be taken into account, even if those
values may sometimes conflict, and even at the expense of determinacy.");
HILLMAN, supra note 6, at 274; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (2003)
("Normative theories that are grounded in a single norm-such as autonomy or
efficiency-also have foundered over the heterogeneity of contractual contexts
to which the theory is to apply.").
9. Oman, supra note 2, at 83 ("Differing normative commitments tend to
lead to different legal rules."); Tony Weir, Case Comment, Contract-The
Buyer's Right To Reject Defective Goods, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 33, 38 (1976)
("Different transactions call for different rules, even if they are all contracts,
just as lockjaw and goitre call for different prescriptions though both are
diseases.").
10. See Oman, supra note 2, at 82.
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has given way to a more realistic model of contracting that is
governed by principles mindful of the quality of assent."
Nevertheless, some theorists argue that policing tools such as
unconscionability are exceptions to the main body of contract law
and therefore largely ineffectual. 2 To the extent that general
contract law's idealized vision survives, it is bound to produce poor
outcomes in many circumstances.
On the flip side, Oman identifies two principal benefits of
general contract law. First, borrowing from public choice theory, he
suggests that legal decision makers are most influenced by those
groups investing the greatest amount of resources in the outcomes.1
However, general contract law reduces the payoff to interest groups,
thereby decreasing the incentive to invest in influencing outcomes.
General contract law reduces payoffs in several ways. For example,
application of general law may be unpredictable because the law is
not specifically geared to a particular set of controversies. In
addition, interest groups are likely to have more competition for the
attention of the drafters and are thus less likely to succeed.15  In
sum, "[T]he first practical, functional defense of contract law's
generality is that it serves as a prophylaxis against capture of the
law by special interests." 6
Second, according to Oman, general contract law facilitates the
resolution of "collective problems." 7  The law achieves this goal
because, by virtue of its generality, parties can experiment with
different forms of transactions and can tailor transactions to fit their
needs." Oman explains that "[t]he transactional agnosticism of
General Contract Law increases the ability of private actors to
experiment with different solutions" to their problems. 9  "By
facilitating the process of trial and error, General Contract Law
serves to advance democratic values, pragmatically conceived." 20
The bottom line, according to Oman, is that general contract law
better facilitates private lawmaking.2 1
11. See HILLMAN, supra note 6, at 128-55.
12. See generally, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (examining the connections
between rules and standards through the lens of contract law, and the
character of contractual concepts such as unconscionability).
13. Oman, supra note 2, at 89-91.
14. Id. at 90-94.
15. Id. at 92.
16. Id. at 93.
17. Id. at 95.
18. Id. at 101-04.
19. Id. at 104.
20. Id.
21. Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which
administers the so-called "battle of the forms," is an example of failed
specialization. Instead of allowing parties to experiment with their use of order
forms and confirmations, the UCC section tied their hands. See generally
2010]1 671
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I would add to Oman's list two additional possible benefits of
general contract law. First, generality means that contract law can
better adapt to rapid changes in the form or substance of exchange
transactions. The discussion of the ALI Principles in Part II of this
Article elaborates on the problem of drafting in the context of rapid
technological advances.22 Second, general law may better reflect the
moral, cultural, and institutional values of a heterogeneous society,
which may lead to more just decisions.n In other words, what
general law gives up in the way of predictability may be more than
made up for by the improvement in substantive results.
Employment law offers an example of the latter point. I have
previously observed that "employees receive a barrage of
communications from their employers" calculated to establish an
"'orderly, cooperative and loyal work force."'25 Employees often rely
on representations and promises in these messages, especially
because of their "material and psychic investments" in their jobs.26
Nevertheless, many courts have applied employment law's
termination-at-will principle at the expense of an employee's
reasonable reliance on job security.27 Perhaps employees would
have had a better chance of achieving job security in this context if
employment law had not broken off from general contract law, the
latter of which emphasizes the "justice" of protecting reasonable
reliance through the vehicle of promissory estoppel.
Oman recognizes that he cannot resolve whether generalization
or specialization is a "better" approach to contract law. 28 Nor can 1.
James J. White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 7 (discussing the successes, failures, and limitations of UCC Article 2); id. at
33 (suggesting that realists "grossly overestimated their knowledge of the
underlying transactions").
22. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
23. See Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 38), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1455386 ("Cultural pluralism is about
acknowledging the cultural background and life experiences which particular
groups such as religious, cultural, political, economic communities share. It is
about the impact which their different backgrounds and life experiences have
upon their individual practices, such as the impact their religious affiliations
have on marriage contracting, or on agreements between spiritual leaders and
congregants.").
24. Thanks to Heather D. Hillman for suggesting this point.
25. Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in
the Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4 (1999) (quoting Touissaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)).
26. Id. at 4-5.
27. Id. at 2, 25-27.
28. Somewhat puzzling to me, however, Oman then opts for a "rule of
thumb" that "problems giving rise to the urge for specialized law are often best
dealt with at the highest level of generality possible." Oman, supra note 2, at
79. I doubt he has made the case for this precisely because there are so many
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However, in the next Part, I explain how the costs and benefits of
generalization identified here apply to the software project and
explain why I think producing the ALI Principles was the right
choice.
II. THE CASE OF THE SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES
The ALI Principles constitute specialized contract law. They
apply to "agreements for the transfer of software for a
consideration," including sales, licenses, leases or access contracts,
whether negotiated or standard form and whether the delivery of
software is by a tangible or electronic medium.2 9  But the ALI
Principles' scope is not overly broad. The project excludes embedded
software unless, measured objectively, the predominant purpose of
the transferee is to obtain the software.o The ALI Principles also
exclude some mixed transactions from their scope.3' Further, the
project does not apply to the transfer of digital media or digital
databases, although they often raise comparable issues, such as the
validity of contract formation types and the enforcement of suspect
terms. 2 The ALI Principles explain that "excluding digital art and
digital databases narrows the transaction types to a manageable
level because digital-art and digital-database transactions implicate
many industries and kinds of transfers."" More important, software
is unique in that it is "a mixture of expressive art and a utilitarian
invention, and does not fit comfortably within any existing class of
intellectual property."34 It is thus worthy of specialization on its
35own.
Are specialized software principles a net benefit? In this Part, I
apply the criteria identified in Part I to respond to this question.
immeasurable (at least based on his methodology) costs and benefits to each
approach.
29. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.06(a) (2009). The
ALI Principles specifically exclude the transfer of disks, CD-ROMs, "or other
tangible medium that stores the software." Id. § 1.06(b).
30. Id. § 1.07(a).
31. The ALI Principles exclude the software portion of mixed transactions
that include software, hard goods, digital content, or services if the predominant
purpose of the transferee was to obtain the non-software subject matter. Id. §
1.08(b).
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 15 (citing Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection-Integrating
Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y
151, 151 (1987) ("It is the hybrid nature of software that causes its failure to fit
neatly into any one existing category of intellectual property, resulting in
seemingly endless confusion as to how it may best be protected.")).
35. See id. at 15-16.
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A. Costs of Generalization
1. Abstract Principles Cannot Predict Outcomes Coherently
Abstract principles of general contract law provide inadequate
guidance to resolve software contract disputes because software
transactions raise numerous new questions. In addition, issues that
have arisen under general contract law often have a unique twist in
the software realm. Here are just a few examples.
a. How To Treat Open-source Software. Under open-source
licenses, software transferees are free to copy, reverse engineer, and
transfer the software, subject to restrictions designed to maintain
the openness of the software." For example, the "same terms"
provision of many open-source licenses requires the transferee to
distribute derivative software to its own transferees using the same
terms as in the original transfer. 3 Among the many terms passed
on is the "copyleft" provision that requires transferees to disclose the
source code of any software the transferee modifies and transfers to
its own transferees." The open-source movement is not unique in
seeking to create a "creative commons," but arguably it is the
preeminent example of the movement. What is unique is the
series of questions open-source software presents for contract law,
such as whether the licenses are contracts, what constitutes assent
to them," whether they are supported by consideration,42 whether
any warranties attach to the quality of the software, and whether
the copyleft and other provisions guaranteeing openness conflict
36. For a discussion of open-source software, see Robert A. Hillman &
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in the Electronic Age, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 311, 313-14 (2009):
Although there are many different open-source licenses, the General
Public License (GPL) is likely the most common. To achieve the goal
of creating a software commons, the GPL authorizes copyholders to
transfer, copy, or modify the software subject to a series of
restrictions. The restrictions are designed to further an environment
of openness by requiring copyholders to reveal the source code to
transferees of any software products that are derived from the original
source code (often referred to as the "copyleft" provision) and to
transfer such software under the same terms as the GPL ("same
terms" provision), making the terms themselves "viral" in nature.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 330.
40. Id. at 313-15; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
§ 1.06 cmt. d (2009).
41. Open-source licenses often provide that "copying, exchanging, or
modifying software constitutes acceptance of the terms of the license."
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.06 cmt. d (2009).
42. See id.; Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 36, at 313-15.
43. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS §§ 3.02-.05 (2009).
[Vol. 45674
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with federal intellectual property law."
The ALI Principles supply answers to each of these questions
that would otherwise remain a challenge under general contract
law. For example, a decision maker applying the foggy
consideration principle under general contract law would receive
little guidance on whether agreeing to the same-terms provision of
an open-source license supplies consideration to support a contract.
The ALI Principles borrow from and expand on general contract law
in meeting this issue head on. Consideration for the software can be
money or something else given in exchange for the software. The
ALI Principles therefore "apply to the transfer of proprietary or
'open-source software' if the transferor requires the transferee to
agree to maintenance or integration services or other consideration
(such as providing source code).""
Terms-of-use agreements attached to open-source software
also may constitute consideration under the ALI Principles,
although the issue of whether some open-source licenses are
contracts is controversial. General contract law distinguishes
between a condition for a gift and consideration, but in the
typical case a court finds consideration if a condition
constitutes more than is necessary to transfer a gift. Terms-of-
use agreements, such as requiring the distribution of
derivative software under the same terms as the initial
transfer, are not necessary to convey software and therefore
46
should constitute consideration under general contract law.
b. Automated Disablement. The ALI Principles define
automated disablement as "the use of electronic means to disable or
materially impair the functionality of software."4  The concept has
roots in creditor remedies such as self-help repossession of collateral
subject to a security interest. However, technology has made it easy
for a transferor to "reach in" to a transferee's computer system and
disable the software, thereby creating a unique set of issues in the
software setting. Obviously, disablement of software can
substantially harm business transferees and some constraint on
disablement is important. However, transferors also suffer if a
transferee continues to use software after a default in payment or
uses the software in an unauthorized manner.48 The ALI Principles
balance the interests of transferors and transferees and authorize
automated disablement in limited circumstances and only after
.49receiving court authorization.
44. Id. § 1.09.
45. Id. § 1.06 cmt. d.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 4.03(a).
48. Id. § 4.03 cmt. a.
49. Id. § 4.03(d).
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c. The Implied Warranty of No Hidden Material Defects of
Which the Transferor Is Aware. According to one expert, "In mass-
market software, a large proportion of defects (often the vast
majority of them) that reach customers are discovered and
intentionally left unfixed by the publisher before the product is
released.""0 If this is true, it certainly sets software apart from
most, if not all, other subject matters of exchange. No one should
expect perfection, but the number of necessary patches and updates
and the not-infrequent frustration of software transferees resulting
from the number of glitches and crashes raises concern, at least if
the problems constitute a material failure of the software. In such
situations, transferors should disclose known material hidden
defects for several reasons that I discuss later."
The ALI Principles thus include a nondisclaimable warranty of
no hidden material defects of which the transferor is aware.12 True,
the warranty borrows from existing law, "including the contract
obligation of good faith, the contract duty to disclose, and
fraudulent-concealment law."53 But confirming that the disclosure
50. Cem Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, COMPUTER LAW., May
2000, at 23.
51. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
52. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 3.05(b) (2009).
Comment b to the section explains why the warranty cannot be disclaimed: the
implied warranty of no material hidden defects is an immutable rule, meaning
that it cannot be disclaimed. A party should not be able to disclaim liability for
what amounts to fraud and case law supports this idea too. Further, the
doctrine of good faith means that a party cannot hide behind an "as is" clause or
the like, when it knows of a material defect that makes the software largely
worthless to the transferee and knows that the transferee cannot reasonably
detect it. Instead, an "as is" clause should mean only that the transferor is not
liable for express promises or implied warranties of merchantability when it
does not know that the software is materially defective and largely worthless.
A transferor can disclose material defects to insulate it from liability under the
subsection. See id. § 3.05 cmt. b.
53. Id. Comment b to the reporters' notes in section 3.05 discusses several
cases and states in part:
Under the common law, a contracting party must disclose material
facts if they are under the party's control and the other party cannot
reasonably be expected to learn the facts. Failure to disclose in such
circumstances may amount to a representation that the fact does not
exist and may be fraudulent.
Id. reporters' notes cmt. b (citing Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[Ulnder certain circumstances there may be a 'duty to
speak.'.. . [Nondisclosure of a fact known to one party may be equivalent to
the assertion that the fact does not exist. . .. Thus, nondisclosure may be
equated with and given the same legal effect as fraud and misrepresentation.")).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts supports the Hill dictum:
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist .. . where he knows that
disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a
basic assumption on which that party is making the contract and if
676 [Vol. 45
THE CASE OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
principle applies to software contracts clarifies and emphasizes the
duty of software vendors to disclose material hidden defects. The
resistance of software transferors, notwithstanding the disclosure
principle's roots in existing law, underscores the importance of
reinforcing this fundamental obligation.
d. Contract Interpretation. Contract interpretation issues
obviously are not unique to software transactions. However, they
are a hot issue in the software context because contracting parties'
terminology often cannot keep up with the rapid changes in
technology and forms of transactions.5 ' As a comment in the ALI
Principles states:
non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and
in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981). Comment d adds:
In many situations, if one party knows that the other is mistaken as
to a basic assumption, he is expected to disclose the fact that would
correct the mistake. A seller of real or personal property is, for
example, ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent defect of
quality or title that is of such a character as would probably prevent
the buyer from buying at the contract price.
Id. § 161 cmt. d.
54. Some large transferors opposed the duty to disclose known material
defects. See, e.g., Letter from the Linux Found. & Microsoft to author, Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Dean, Boston Univ. Sch. of Law & Lance Liebman, Dir., Am. Law
Inst. (May 14, 2009), http://microsoftontheissues.com/downloads/Microsoft
-LinuxFoundation-letter.pdf [hereinafter Linux/Microsoft Letter]. In part, they
claimed that the rule would increase administrative costs, such as the costs of
notifying end users of material defects. See Letter from the Ass'n of Corporate
Counsel's IT, Privacy & eCommerce Comm. to author & Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Dean, Boston Univ. Sch. of Law (May 11, 2009), www.ali.org/doc/Comments
-ACC.pdf. But, in some instances, posting a list of material defects on the
transferor's website should suffice. In others, notification by e-mail should be
sufficient.
Transferors also complained that the rule would "increase[] litigation," a cry
often heard by business against consumer protection of any kind. See supra,
Linux/Microsoft Letter. But a defect must be sufficiently serious so that it
would constitute a material breach of the contract. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 3.05 cmt. b (2009). And the defect also must be hidden,
meaning that a software transferee could not find it upon any reasonable
testing. Id. As a comment to the ALI Principles points out:
Putting together the requirements of transferor actual knowledge of
the defect at the time of the transfer, transferee reasonable lack of
knowledge, and a defect that constitutes a material breach means that
a transferor would not be liable if the transferor has received reports
of problems but reasonably has not had time to investigate them, if
the transferee's problems are caused by uses of which the transferor is
unaware, if the transferor learns of problems only after the transfer,
and if the problems are benign or require reasonable workarounds to
achieve functionality.
Id.
55. See, e.g., PlayMedia Sys., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1094
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
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[C]ontract terms do not always keep up with the parties'
understanding of precisely what software is being transferred
because vendors continue to improve the functionality and
features of software, distribute many different versions, and
provide plug-ins and updates. Further, an agreement may fail
to delineate clearly authorized uses of software because
technology has created new uses during the contracting or
performance periods. In addition, parties do not always
clearly describe the meaning of terms involving, for example,
functionality and quality because of software's complexity,
tendency to contain bugs, and, in some instances, uniqueness.
In fact, the case law is expanding rapidly on all of these fronts,
making the clear formulation of rules of interpretation
particularly relevant in the software realm.56
In addition to rapid technological change, contract
interpretation constitutes a novel challenge in the software context
because the parties draft licenses in the shadow of federal
intellectual property law. For example, federal copyright law may
preempt a contract term if it infringes on federally protected rights
such as fair use.5
The ALI Principles offer guidance on this set of issues. For
example, the project sets forth a streamlined parol evidence rule
that clarifies the judicial procedure for determining whether a
writing is ambiguous or incomplete." In addition, the ALI
Principles clarify when the parties have failed to make an
enforceable agreement because of a misunderstanding as to the
nature of the software terms. 9 The ALI Principles also set forth a
provision on "Enforcement of Terms Under Federal Intellectual
Property Law" geared to promote innovation and the creation of a
"rich public domain."60
2. The Absence of a Unitary Normative Theory
A second cost of general contract law identified by Oman is the
absence of a unitary normative theory.6 ' However, I am reluctant to
call general contract law's social and economic pluralism a cost. In
truth,
[F]or all of its failings, our system of "private" exchange
seems to work better than alternatives precisely because it
does seek to harmonize the value of private preferences and
56. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 215 (2009).
57. Id. § 1.09 & cmt. a. On the relationship between federal copyright law
and the interpretation of licenses, see, for example, S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 3.08 (2009).
59. Id. § 3.10(b).
60. Id. § 1.09 & cmt. c.
61. Oman, supra note 2, at 82-83.
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the need for social control. The various norms of contract
law reflect the major social, economic, and institutional
forces of a pluralistic society. . . . In short, contract law
flourishes largely because it is the fruit of the legal system's
reasonable and practical compromises over conflicting
values and interests in a diverse society.62
Unitary theories of general contract law, on the other hand,
obfuscate the law by desperately attempting to fit its diverse rules
and principles into a single framework.6 3
If the ALI Principles succeed, it will not be because their
foundation is a unitary theory, but because they share general
contract law's pluralism. The ALI Principles draw on, among other
things, freedom of contract, morality, fairness, reasonableness,
efficiency, and public policy. 4 The ALI Principles also borrow from
state tort and property law, and federal law and policy in areas such
as antitrust and intellectual property law. But pragmatism does not
have to mean indeterminacy. The goal was to carefully draft rules
and clarifying comments that would help guide decision making and
limit the number of "hard" cases that defy predictability.
3. Undesirable Outcomes of General Law
As mentioned, contract law's idealized view of fair bargaining
between equal parties, to the extent that it still exists, fails to
account for, among other things, take-it-or-leave-it form contracts,
unequal bargaining power, and resulting "dangerous terms."66 The
ALI Principles do not ignore such problems. For example, they
apply to the digital delivery of software supported by electronic form
contracts that transferees neither read carefully nor even peruse.67
These e-standard forms may include oppressive terms, such as
automatic renewal, modification without notice, and authorization
to download spyware on the transferee's computer." In partial
response, the ALI Principles set forth a safe harbor that encourages
69
disclosure of terms even before a shopper initiates a transaction.
The ALI Principles also favor clickwrap agreements, in which the
62. HILLMAN, supra note 6, at 268-69.
63. See generally id.
64. See infra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.
65. See HILLMAN, supra note 6, at 269-70 ("[Alcknowledging the reality of
limited determinacy in contract law would not threaten the institution's
legitimacy or mean that judges have unbridled discretion. Many, if not most,
cases fall within one principle or another. Judges simply enjoy room in hard
cases to attempt to harmonize the principles to fit the context.").
66. See generally Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/wp/eula.php (last visited Sep. 1, 2010) (discussing
harmful terms of end user license agreements).
67. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (2009).
68. See Newitz, supra note 66.
69. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02(c) (2009).
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transferee must click "I agree" next to or at the end of the
e-standard form.o Although these approaches may fail to increase
general reading very much, access to terms enables watchdog
groups to list offensive terms on the Internet and create adverse
publicity that may persuade transferors to draft reasonable terms."
Further, even if transferees continue to ignore e-standard forms, the
ALI Principles' disclosure duty reinforces Karl Llewellyn's
conception that a promisee who has had a reasonable opportunity to
read a standard form gives blanket assent to its reasonable terms. 2
Blanket assent means that the promisee consents to delegate to the
drafter the duty to write reasonable terms.
Although critics of disclosure deem it ineffectual and even
wasteful, other solutions to the problem seem even more
problematic. 74 For example, the law could require a transferee to
click "I agree" at the end of each term or at least particularly
onerous ones, such as automatic renewals. But such cumbersome
procedures may fail to promote additional reading and may simply
slow down transactions to the benefit of neither party.76 Another
proposal is to place oversight of the content of standard forms in the
77
hands of a governmental agency. This would introduce new
worries such as agency capture by software vendors, lack of agency
resources to police forms adequately, and inability to appropriately
weigh context-dependent variables. Needless to say, agency
involvement also jeopardizes the freedom and privacy of the
exchange process.
Some writers seem bothered by the fact that the ALI Principles'
70. Id.; see also id § 2.02 cmts. b-c. Browsewrap, in which the transferee
has to browse to find the governing form, often would not suffice. Id. § 2.02 cmt.
b.
71. Id. at 115.
72. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 455, 492 (2002).
73. See id. at 492 ("If e-consumers have some opportunity to read the
standard terms before deciding whether to enter into the contract, then courts
should apply Llewellyn's presumption of enforceability of such terms. Just as in
the paper world, consumers understand the existence of standard terms and
agree to be bound by them, even though they rarely choose to read them.").
74. See generally, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011). Some critics are especially zealous in their criticism of disclosure
strategies: "[J]udicial inquiry about the conspicuousness and clarity of form
contract terms is a waste and a fraud unless it really is a covert investigation of
the fairness of the contract." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES
OF SALES LAW 43 (2009).
75. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 120 (2009).
76. See Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers
in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (2009).
77. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Preapproved Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE:
FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 95, 96 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
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solutions to problems may have resonance in other forums ." For
example, lawmakers could apply the disclosure approaches adopted
by the ALI Principles to any subject matter of exchange, not just
software. In fact, nothing should stop courts or legislatures from
applying helpful sections of the ALI Principles to other subject
matters and even from including them in a future Restatement
(Third) of Contracts. But as stated elsewhere:
Law reform has to start somewhere, and a focus on software
transactions that are currently governed by law that predates
even an inkling of the digital revolution, makes sense. In
drafting the Principles (with great help from our ALI advisers,
council members, and consultative group), we were able to
focus, among other things, on the nature of software, the types
of software transaction, and the parties to them. We could
evaluate prospective rules in this field against the goals of
clarity, efficiency, and fairness. We could avoid the level of
generality in drafting that often produces legal ambiguity and
limited usefulness.. . . And we could leave to other law
reformers who are evaluating a new set of issues in another
subject area, whether our rules makes sense in their domain.
B. Benefits of General Contract Law
I have reviewed several possible benefits of general contract
law. Here I analyze whether the specialization of software contract
law came at the expense of these benefits.
1. Insulation from Interest Groups
For the reasons discussed in Part I, Professor Oman suggests
that general contract law is better insulated from interest groups
than specialized law."o But the process of producing the ALI
Principles largely shielded the project from interest group capture."
Most important, the ALI selected a diverse group of advisers,
including judges, lawyers, legal theorists, and technicians, with
varying experiences dealing with software contract issues.82 These
78. See generally Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is It Time for the
Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 195 (2009) (expressing
concern that Restatements and Principles may erode existing bodies of law).
79. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2010).
80. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
81. But cf. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783
(1994) (discussing the effects of interest groups and internal conflicts of interest
on Article 9 of the UCC).
82. Advisers represented or had dealings with large and small software
transferors, consumer groups, business transferees, and software foundations
and organizations. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, at V
(2009). Liaisons included people from the American Bar Association's Section of
Science and Technology Law, the Business Software Alliance, and the Uniform
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advisers drew on their experiences and perspectives to convey
concerns. Of course, interested parties and organizations that were
not part of the formal ALI process weighed in heavily as well in
meetings with the reporters, on the telephone, and through Internet
postings and e-mails. For example, large software developers
registered their objections to the warranty of no material hidden
defects by writing letters to the ALI membership and the Director
and by posting articles on the Internet." On the whole, this input
enriched the rulemaking process without overwhelming it, largely
because the ALI process ensured access to all sides in the debate. In
addition, perhaps the knowledge that the ALI Principles were not
statutes-but in essence simply guidance for courts-toned down
interest group responses both in number and vehemence.
2. "Laboratories of Democracy" Facilitate Resolution of
Collective Problems
Will the ALI Principles inhibit experimentation and evolution
towards new software transaction types? The answer, of course,
depends on the nature of the ALI Principles and the kind of
experimentation envisioned. The ALI Principles are, for the most
part, default rules that should not impede experimentation if the
latter refers to contracting parties achieving through trial and error
more efficient and fairer exchanges.8" For example, the ALI
Principles set forth a disclaimable implied merchantability
warranty." The issue of what constitutes "merchantable" software
is controversial because of software's tendency to contain glitches.
But business parties' hands are not tied in light of this default rule.
They can allocate the risk of unknown defects and shape remedies
as best suits them. Further, as mentioned earlier, the ALI
Principles seek to increase reading of forms and incentives to write
fair terms by setting forth a safe harbor that requires ample
disclosure of the standard form. 86 But transferors are free to
experiment with other modes of formation. The ALI Principles'
general formation rule is that "[a] transferee adopts a standard form
as a contract when a reasonable transferor would believe the
transferee intends to be bound. . . ."" This objective test obviously
should not hinder future development of modes of assent to
standard forms.
Law Commission. See id. at vi. The project also received input from ALI's
Consultative Group made up of ALI members interested in contributing to the
software project. See id. at vii.
83. See, e.g., Linux/Microsoft Letter, supra note 54.
84. But see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97
Nw. U. L. REV 1227, 1269-72 (2003) (arguing that it is costly to contract around
default rules).
85. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 3.03(a) (2009).
86. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
87. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02(b) (2009).
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Still, as a general matter, the tailored rules of the ALI
Principles obviously constitute more specific regulation of software
contracting than general contract law. But the issue is whether the
benefit of drafting clarifying rules exceeds the cost of regulation.
The answer depends in part on whether software technology and
transaction types have evolved to the point where clarification of the
law helps more than hurts. In the judgment of the ALI, the time
came for clarification of the law: "[DIenominating the Project as
'Principles of the Law of Software Contracts' does not shield it from
the claim that any legal work in this area is premature. However,
the benefits of establishing some order now outweigh the costs of
having to accommodate new technologies and business methods
later."88 The next Subpart elaborates on the issue of whether the
time was ripe for software rules.
3. Generalization and Rapid Change
As just noted, specialized law does not have to be inflexible.
Specialized law that includes default rules and broad standards
minimizes the problem of keeping up with rapid changes in
technology and kinds of transactions. In addition, drafters of
specialized law can watch for developments in the field and
accommodate them. For example, we can expect to see dramatic
advances in the use of "cloud computing," which essentially means
that transferees will access software on the Internet instead of
downloading it onto their own computers.89 But issues of contract
formation, interpretation, breach, and remedies arise under "access
contracts," just as they arise under current contracts for the transfer
of software. The ALI Principles therefore include access contracts
within the scope of the project.90 But the ALI Principles also include
special carve-outs for situations in which access contracts should be
treated differently. For example, the remedy of automated
disablement, discussed earlier, which requires a transferor to
receive a court order before disabling software, does not apply to
access contracts." Transferors that offer access to their software for
88. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 3 (2009). But see Peter
A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B()oom of Products Liability Theory in Cases
of Deficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REV. 269, 271-72 (1999) ("Because the
technology that a uniform software license law would govern has not reached
anything even approaching repose, it is impossible to draft a U.C.C. software
article in the best Llewellynesque tradition.").
89. See Battle of the Clouds, EcONOMIST, Oct. 17, 2009, at 16.
90. "Software agreements include agreements to sell, lease, license, access,
or otherwise transfer or share software." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE
CONTRACTS § 1.06(a) (2009). Further, the ALI Principles define an access
agreement as "an agreement that authorizes the user of software to access the
provider's software via a data-transmission system, such as the internet, or via
a private network or another intermediary now known or hereafter developed."
Id. § 1.01(a).
91. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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a price should not be required to obtain a court order before cutting
off access to breaching transferees who fail to pay or use the
software in an unauthorized manner. The automated disablement
rule therefore does not apply "if the transferor engages in self-help
by refusing access to its systems without reaching in to the
transferee's systems to disable software. In such cases, the
transferor is not using 'electronic means to disable or materially
impair the functionality of software."'92
4. Values of a Heterogeneous Society
I have already argued that the diversity of norms and pragmatic
model of decision making of general contract law that the ALI
Principles share best facilitate exchange transactions. In this
Subpart, I describe in greater depth some of the norms that enrich
the ALI Principles.
a. Freedom of Contract. Freedom of contract is, of course, the
foundation of contract law. In fact, general contract law largely
consists of default rules that apply when the parties do not contract
around them. The ALI Principles also consist mainly of default
rules, along with safe harbors and examples of best practices.93 The
ALI Principles' few mandatory rule exceptions are not foreign to
general contract or other law.94
b. Honesty. The ALI Principles police against sharp practices,
such as failing to disclose known material defects that the
transferee cannot discover, inducing sales by making express
warranties only to disclaim them in a standard form, and
unilaterally modifying terms without notice for the purpose of
extracting unbargained-for gains.99 The ALL Principles respond to
each of these instances of dishonesty by, in turn, creating the
92. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 4.03 cmt. a (2009).
The project also considered the rapid rise of software embedded in hard goods,
such as software embedded in most appliances and automobiles. Id. § 1.07 cmt.
a. The ALI Principles apply a "predominant purpose" test to determine whether
embedded software comes within its scope. Id. § 1.07(a).
93. See, e.g., id. § 3.03(a) (implied warranty default rule); id. § 2.02(c)
(formation safe harbor and best practices).
94. Mandatory rules in the ALI Principles include § 1.13(a) (stating that
the ALI Principles choice of law rule applies if the law chosen by the parties in a
standard form "would lead to a result that is repugnant to public policy as
expressed in the law of the jurisdiction that would otherwise govern "); §1.14
(requiring that the forum chosen not be "unfair or unreasonable"); § 3.05(b)
(establishing a warranty of no material hidden defect); § 4.01(b) (providing the
full range of remedies to an aggrieved transferee if the "circumstances cause an
exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose"); § 4.02 (limiting the
enforceability of liquidated damages provisions); § 4.03(e) (prohibiting
unauthorized automated disablement).
95. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS §§ 2.03(d), 3.05(b),
3.06(a), 3.06 cmt. a (2009); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 45684
THE CASE OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
warranty of no hidden material defects, declining to enforce express
warranty disclaimers that the transferee reasonably should not
expect, and barring unilateral modification of standard form
contracts in the retail-like setting.96
c. Fairness. Fairness in the ALI Principles in part means
balancing the interests of the parties with the goal of ensuring that
each enjoys the fruits of their exchange. For example, the ALI
Principles' unconscionability provision polices against unfairness in
the bargaining process and the resulting terms.98 In addition, the
ALI Principles' handful of mandatory provisions in part focus on the
potential for unfairness in take-it-or-leave-it standard forms, a
problem magnified by the use of electronic forms. For example, the
parties' choice of law in a standard form must bear a reasonable
relationship to the transaction.99 Further, the ALI Principles seek to
ensure fairness by requiring reasonable communication between the
parties. For example, mere notice of a unilateral modification is
insufficient in the case of standard form transfers even if the
original contract authorizes this mode of modification.'00  In
addition, as we have seen, a transferor must disclose known
material defects in the software. 0'
d. Reasonableness. The ALI Principles contain many provisions
fostering reasonable conduct. For example, they set forth an
example of reasonable prohibitions on reverse engineering. 0 2 In
addition, the ALI Principles rest contract and modification
formation on whether a reasonable person would believe the
transferee intends to be bound. o0 Further, the ALI Principles
determine whether a transferor made an express warranty based on
whether a reasonable transferee could rely on the promise or
representation.1 4
e. Public welfare. The ALI Principles naturally also take into
account public welfare. For example, the project evaluates whether
the parties can contractually narrow or extinguish transferee rights
such as federal fair-use rights or expand transferor copyright or
96. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS §§ 2.03(d), 3.05(b),
3.06(a) (2009).
97. See generally Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of
Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (1983) (discussing judicial
balancing of fairness factors in contract cessation).
98. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.11 (2009).
99. Id. § 1.13(a).
100. Id. § 2.03(d).
101. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
102. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.09 cmt. c, illus. 3
(2009).
103. See id. § 2.01(a); id § 2.01 cmt. b; id. 2.03(a); id. 2.03 cmt. a.
104. Id. § 3.02(b).
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patent rights beyond the protection afforded by federal law.
According to the ALI Principles, such terms "strike at the heart of
the intellectual property balance between promoting the public
welfare by granting exclusive rights as an incentive to innovate, and
promoting the public welfare through robust competition fueled in
part by broad dissemination of information and a rich public
domain."10 The ALI Principles ask courts to be especially vigilant
when such terms appear in a take-it-or-leave-it standard form. 06
Not only do the ALI Principles as a whole reflect multiple
norms, many of the individual software rules draw on a diversity of
norms and principles as well. For example, the duty to disclose
material defects is based on economic efficiency, autonomy,
corrective justice, contractarian theory, and morality.10 ' Efficiency
requires law that moves resources to "their most productive uses
with as few transactions costs as possible. . . ."'os The disclosure
obligation helps achieve this goal by increasing information
available to the parties, which helps ensure that each party values
what they receive more than what they transfer.'09 In addition, the
disclosure duty reduces costs. For example, if a material defect is
hidden but known to the transferor, the transferee must swallow the
costs of using defective software in the absence of a disclosure
duty."10  Disclosure also eliminates duplicative searches for
information."' But the duty to disclose will not deter transferors
from acquiring useful information about the quality of the software
because the information inevitably will be revealed during the
process of engineering the software.112 Nor will administration of
the rule be too costly because the rule depends on longstanding
105. Id. § 1.09 cmt. c.
106. See id. For a discussion of contracting around fair use, see Charles R.
McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping") of American Copyright
Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1999).
107. Dean Maureen O'Rourke and I elaborate on these themes in Hillman &
O'Rourke, supra note 74.
108. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 112
(1993).
109. "[Tlhe more information individuals possess about goods they buy and
sell, the more reason society has to think that these goods will go to those who
most value them, and hence, the better off society will be." Alan Strudler,
Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337, 350
(1997).
110. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 3.05(b) (2009); id.
§ 3.05 cmt. b.
111. TREBILCOCK, supra note 108, at 112 ("[Tlhere should be a general
presumption in favour of disclosure of material facts known to one party and
unknown to the other. [Otherwise, people will] invest in wasteful precautions
to generate information about the asset [that the first party already has].").
112. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-15 (1978) (discussing the creation of
incentives to produce information).
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existing law that through time has developed clear boundaries." 3
Additional norms support the duty to disclose material hidden
defects. For example, the principle of autonomy requires assent
based on knowledge of all pertinent facts.114 Corrective justice bars
gains acquired by taking advantage of the other party's ignorance."'
Contractarians reason that people cognizant of the context would
expect transferors to disclose important secrets that protect the
transferee from serious harm." 6  Moralists require disclosure
because it is "impermissible to take advantage of another party's
ignorance of material facts.,,17
CONCLUSION
Software contracting raises several challenging issues. Because
of the importance of software to the economy, clarifying the law
through specialization is inevitable whether it comes from courts
adopting the ALI Principles or through a more gradual common law
development of software cases. " Nevertheless, the distinction
between general contract law and specialized software rules need
not be stark. The ALI Principles necessarily borrow from general
contract law on issues such as the meaning of consent, the nature of
breach, and the menu of remedies. As with general contract law,
the ALI Principles also reflect the various norms of a diverse society,
while carving out special rules attentive to specific problems. Both
general contract law and the ALI Principles consist mainly of
default rules and partly of flexible standards. I suspect that most
specialized bodies of law share such characteristics with general
contract law. In the case of the ALI Principles, the result of this
amalgamation of the general and specific is a body of principles that
hopefully predicts outcomes and reaches desirable results without
handcuffing innovation or increasing the susceptibility of decision
makers to interest group pressure.
113. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 3.05 cmt. b
(2009).
114. TREBILCOCK, supra note 108, at 107.
115. See Marc Ramsay, The Buyer/Seller Asymmetry: Corrective Justice and
Material Non-Disclosure, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 115, 139-40, 142 (2006). See
generally Strudler, supra note 109.
116. TREBILCOCK, supra note 108, at 109 (discussing KIM LANE SCHEPPELE,
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988)).
117. See Ramsay, supra note 115, at 135 (discussing CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981)).
118. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 1 n.2 (2009).
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